William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 12 (2020-2021)
Issue 1

Article 7

November 2020

A New Era of Legal Services: The Elimination of Unauthorized
Practice of Law Rules to Accompany the Growth of Legal
Software
Julian Moradian

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Part of the Legal Profession Commons

Repository Citation
Julian Moradian, A New Era of Legal Services: The Elimination of Unauthorized Practice of Law
Rules to Accompany the Growth of Legal Software, 12 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 247 (2020),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol12/iss1/7
Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr

A NEW ERA OF LEGAL SERVICES: THE
ELIMINATION OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAW RULES TO ACCOMPANY THE GROWTH OF
LEGAL SOFTWARE
JULIAN MORADIAN*
ABSTRACT
Since the inception of bar associations in the early twentieth
century, states have promulgated rules that prohibit unlicensed
individuals from providing legal services. These unauthorized
practice of law rules have created a monopoly on legal services,
which in turn has inflated the price of obtaining legal services to a
point where a significant percentage of individuals who need such
services are unable to obtain them. Legal software has the potential
to disrupt the market for legal services and make such services
available to the mass market. However, for innovation and widespread use of legal software to gain traction, these unauthorized
practice of law rules must be eliminated. In their place, various
guards must be adopted by state and federal legal authorities to
ensure consumers are protected following the elimination of unauthorized practice of law rules, including but not limited to the
expansion of current false advertising and malpractice law.
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INTRODUCTION
In modern society, it would certainly seem as though to
purchase legal services, one would need to speak to a licensed
attorney. However, with the proliferation of technology, new avenues of obtaining legal services have emerged.1 It may come as a
surprise that before the twentieth century, individuals did not
always need to have a law degree to provide legal services.2
Through the passing of unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) rules,
states created a monopoly on legal services under the facade of
protecting the consumer from mediocre representation.3 Instead,
states created a gap in justice where those individuals most in
need of legal services, such as low-income households, are unable to access those services because of monopoly prices.4 That is
where legal software comes in.5
Legal software is able to cut down the cost of legal services,
thereby allowing more consumers to enter the market.6 However,
UPL rules have disturbed the proliferation of the software from
entering the market and created uncertainty regarding its future.7
This Note dives into the history of UPL rules and their effect on the
market, and the prevalence of legal software. Part I explores the
history and origination of UPL laws and their development over
the decades and through different states. Part II discusses the
drawbacks and effects of UPL laws on the legal market and related
software and advocates for their elimination. Part III discusses
possible avenues of consumer protection when UPL rules are
See, e.g., LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/personal/estate-plan
ning/living-trust-overview.html [https://perma.cc/6AX6-GKUX].
2 RUSSELL G. PEARCE ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 27 (3d. ed. 2017).
3 Mathew Rotenberg, Note, Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of
Law and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 714–15 (2012).
4 See Cynthia L. Fountaine, When Is a Computer a Lawyer?: Interactive
Legal Software, Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the First Amendment, 71
U. CIN. L. REV. 147, 148 (2002).
5 Paul F. Kirgis, The Knowledge Guild: The Legal Profession in an Age of
Technological Change, 11 NEV. L.J. 184, 196 (2010) (reviewing RICHARD SUSSKIND,
THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2008)).
6 See William H. Brown, Comment, Legal Software and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: Protection or Protectionism, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 157, 160 (1999).
7 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39.
1

250 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:247
eliminated, while Part IV discusses the effects of monopolies and
the economics of a free market without such monopolies.
I.THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW RULES
Although it would seem that lawyers have held a tight grip
on the practice of law since the inception of the profession, the
scope of the monopoly on legal services has varied over time.8 In
fact, until the twentieth century, non-lawyer-run businesses and
non-profits often provided transactional and litigation services,
retaining an attorney only when it was necessary to appear in
court on behalf of the organization or client.9
Following their creation in the early twentieth century,
numerous bar associations began to adopt the goal of conditioning
bar membership on certain educational requirements.10 The New
York County Lawyers Association took the lead on this movement
and appointed the first committee in 1914 on the unauthorized
practice of law in response to a growing business industry that
was overlapping with legal work.11 After New York, numerous state
bar associations followed suit in the decades following and created
their own UPL statutes or even broadened the scope of UPL laws
they already had.12 In 1930, the American Bar Association (ABA)
created its own committee on the unauthorized practice of law.13
By 1938, over 400 similar committees had been established across
the nation.14 Once state courts began implementing versions of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct into their UPL rules
during the second half of the twentieth century, UPL regulation
became more standard across the country.15
However, although the Model Rules prompted widespread
adoption of UPL rules, the definition of the practice of law itself
Id. at 27.
Id.
10 Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 713.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 713–14.
13 Id. at 714.
14 Id.
15 Id.
8
9
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chosen by each jurisdiction has become anything but uniform.16
The Model Rules themselves fail to provide a standard definition,
stating instead, “[t]he definition of the practice of law is established
by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another.”17 Further,
these various definitions themselves are not always derived from
statutes.18 In some states, the definition of what constitutes the
practice of law is found instead through case law.19
Another problem rests with interpreting these rules—
“While almost all states ... currently have statutes that purport
to define the practice of law, in reality these statutes tend to be
vague in scope and contain broad qualifiers.”20 These qualifiers
fail to provide concrete guidance to courts and state bar agencies
on what can confidently be labeled as the practice of law.21 For
example, in Texas, the UPL statute provides, “[t]he definition in
this section is not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial
branch of the power and authority ... to determine whether other
services and acts not enumerated may constitute the practice of
law.”22 Open-ended definitions such as this confuse entities attempting to apply the rules to different activities that seem legal.23
As a result, different interpretations have emerged attempting
to encircle what acts constitute the practice of law.24
One such interpretation states that the practice of law entails those acts that were “traditionally performed” by lawyers,
with some exceptions.25 Another test revolves around whether
an attorney-client relationship (explained below) has been created
by law.26 What is clear from these split interpretations is that it
See id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment Letter on American Bar Association’s Proposed Model Definition of the Practice
of Law (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/20
08/03/26/200604.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN56-FUQD] [hereinafter Comment Letter].
17 Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 812 (2002).
18 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 28.
19 Id.
20 See Comment Letter, supra note 16.
21 See id.
22 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(b) (West 1999).
23 See Comment Letter, supra note 16.
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
16
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is inherently difficult to define the practice of law and the scope
of activities that are traditionally held by lawyers.27
Another difficulty with UPL rules has been applying the
varying interpretations to different activities:
[T]here are an increasing number of situations where nonlawyers
are providing services that are difficult to categorize under
current statutes and case law as being, or not being, the delivery
of legal services. This growing gray area may be partially responsible for the spotty enforcement of unauthorized practice of law
statutes across the nation and [arguably] an increasing number of attendant problems related to the delivery of services
by nonlawyers.28

In the seminal case of Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, the Supreme Court of Florida delineated certain activities being performed
by a secretary as engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.29
The secretary had been preparing legal documents in uncontested
marriage dissolutions.30 The court stated that while performing
services like printing standardized forms is not improper, these
activities cross the line into the unauthorized practice of law
when the preparer assists parties on how to fill out the form or
advises consumers on possible remedies specific to their situation.31 The fine line between constituting the practice of law was
drawn by the court when there is a consultation that directly
addresses the client’s situation, but not when a preparer standardizes or creates his or her product without such advising.32
The court’s ruling exemplified this principle when the court held
that the secretary was allowed to copy the information on legal
forms that she obtained from her former business but could not
directly advise the client on how to prepare the form.33
PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 28.
Comment Letter, supra note 16 (quoting A.B.A., CHALLENGE STATEMENT:
MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/task_force_model_definition
_practice_law/model_definition_challenge/ [https://perma.cc/XV3E-DQ8M]).
29 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978).
30 Id. at 1189.
31 Id. at 1194.
32 Id.
33 Id.
27
28
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The same principle in Brumbaugh was present in Dacey v.
New York County Lawyers’ Association.34 In Dacey, New York’s
highest court agreed with the dissent opinion of the lower court,35
which held that a legal advice book titled How to Avoid Probate!
did not violate any UPL rules.36 Specifically, regarding a legal help
book sold to the general public, Justice Stevens stated in his dissent,
“[t]here is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client.”37 Justice
Stevens elaborated on the idea that such a freely purchased medium that purports to offer advice on common problems does not
create the level of personal reliance that is present in an attorneyclient relationship.38
“As computer technology advances at an astonishing rate,
the law often struggles to keep pace with the corresponding development of new issues of law or, at the very least, new twists
to existing law.”39 Brumbaugh and Dacey made clear that a level
of intimate personal relationship had to be present between a client
and the source of legal aid to violate UPL rules.40 Such a relationship did not exist between either a consumer and a book sold
to the public, or between a client and a secretary providing untailored copy and print services of legal documents.41
However, a different situation arises when the provider of
legal services is instead computerized software that provides particularized legal documents tailored to a consumer’s input of information.42 One of the first cases on this topic came from Texas:
Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology.43
This case involved the Quicken Family Lawyer software, which
See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 35.
See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459, 459 (N.Y. 1967).
36 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 28 A.D.2d 161, 174–75 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1967) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 174.
38 See id. at 174–75.
39 Steve French, Note, When Public Policies Collide ... Legal “Self-Help” Software and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH.
L.J. 93 (2001).
40 See Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978); PEARCE
ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–36.
41 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 34–35.
42 See id. at 37–38.
43 No. Civ. A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999).
34
35
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“offer[ed] over 100 different legal forms[, ]such as employment
agreements[ or] real estate leases ... along with instructions on
how to fill out [the] forms.”44 The software itself worked by asking
preliminary questions and then provided tailored documents
specific to each consumer’s situation.45 The Texas district court
explained that this dynamic went beyond a simple book instruction
guide and constituted the practice of law, and the court consequently enjoined the sale of the software.46
Similar to the Quicken software, a more modern software
and service from LegalZoom has come under scrutiny from the
courts for its intrusion into the legal market.47 The LegalZoom
software provides various legal forms in numerous areas, including
Limited Liability Company (LLC) formation, estate planning,
trademark, and even bankruptcy.48 Applying the principles from
Brumbaugh, LegalZoom providing blank legal documents does
not run afoul of UPL rules.49 Where LegalZoom runs into trouble is
with its tailored legal services.50 At the consumer’s request, the
program will convey questionnaires to a client and return completed legal documents that integrate the answers provided from
the questionnaires.51 After the consumer completes the questionnaires, LegalZoom’s document assistants review the answers
on the generated document for consistency and accuracy.52 Going a
step further, once the document has been reviewed and printed,
LegalZoom then sends the document to the consumer with specific instructions on how to finalize the document.53
Numerous jurisdictions have taken a hostile position and
asserted that LegalZoom’s consumer-tailored model constitutes
the unauthorized practice of law.54 In North Carolina, the State
See id. at *1.
See id. at *1–2.
46 Id. at *6.
47 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39.
48 LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/ [https://perma.cc/5BMF-R3MN];
see Isaac Figueras, Comment, The LegalZoom Identity Crisis: Legal Form Provider
or Lawyer in Sheep’s Clothing?, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1419, 1423 (2013).
49 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 28.
50 See generally LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111,
2014 WL 1213242, at *1–2 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Mar. 24, 2014).
51 Id. at *6.
52 Id.
53 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 41.
54 Id. at 39; see LegalZoom.com, Inc., 2014 WL 1213242, at *1–2.
44
45
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Bar put teeth to this argument by prohibiting the program from
offering its services to the state.55 In response, LegalZoom filed
suit, arguing the State Bar exceeded its statutory powers by taking
such action, with the State Bar counterclaiming on the grounds
of the UPL.56 Once all pleadings were submitted, the trial court
denied the state bar’s request for judgment on the pleadings.57
The court found that although LegalZoom’s program did not constitute a form of self-representation, it was unsure whether to
apply the Brumbaugh principles to LegalZoom.58 In other words,
the court was unsure about whether to label LegalZoom as a program that provides express or tailored legal judgment using input from information provided by a client.59
The case came to an abrupt halt when the parties signed
a consent judgment that deemed LegalZoom not to have violated
UPL rules so long as it (1) provided a North Carolina consumer
of LegalZoom a means to see the blank template or finalized
template before purchase; (2) retained an attorney licensed to practice in North Carolina to review the blank templates being offered; (3) made an explicit communication to consumers that the
forms and templates are not a substitute for the services of an
attorney; (4) disclosed its legal name and physical location; (5)
did not disclaim any warranties or liabilities and did not limit the
recovery of damages; and (6) did not force a consumer in North
Carolina to agree to jurisdiction or venue in any state other than
North Carolina should any dispute arise.60
As technology evolves, UPL rules may even infringe on
the future of smart contracts.61 The smart contract is a digital
agreement that self-executes after the completion of a certain
function, similar to how a vending machine disburses a drink after
coins have been entered into the machine.62 Specifically, “[t]he
See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39.
Id.
57 Id.
58 See LegalZoom.com, Inc., 2014 WL 1213242, at *14; PEARCE ET AL., supra
note 2, at 39.
59 PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39.
60 LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2015 WL
6441853 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Oct. 22, 2015).
61 See Sarah Templin, Blocked-Chain: The Application of the Unauthorized
Practice of Law to Smart Contracts, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 957, 957 (2019).
62 Id. at 959.
55
56
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blockchain allows for automation of the execution of the contract, with the contract embodied within the code of the blockchain....”63 This ingenuity may infringe on the practice of law as
non-lawyers such as coders may be able to prepare contracts while
securing legal rights for consumers of smart contracts in the performance of the contract.64
Looking towards the future, the application of UPL rules
on advancing technology can be intimidating with the uncertainty
stemming from not only broad definitions of the practice of law,
but also the mixed reactions given to activities that might encroach on these definitions.65
II.THE EFFECTS OF UPL RULES ON THE LEGAL
MARKET AND LEGAL SOFTWARE
The question to be asked regarding the up-and-coming prominence of legal software is what purpose do UPL rules serve? The
most common rationale is that these regulations protect the public
from ineffectual legal services.66 “According to the ABA Model
Rules, ‘[l]imiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified
persons.’”67 According to this theory, untrained individuals performing legal services for a consumer can lead to the client’s
harm while also causing further expense and litigation as a result.68 However, the strongest of these arguments is that unlicensed individuals who perform legal services are not subject to
rules concerning confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and attorneyclient privilege.69
While the arguments supporting the relevance of UPL
rules are valid, there may be other arguments for why they exist
underneath the facade of public policy.70 “Unauthorized practice
Id.
Id. at 968.
65 See Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978) (Karl, J.,
concurring specially).
66 Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 714.
67 Id. at 714–15 (citing MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 1 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1995)).
68 Id. at 715.
69 Id.
70 See id.
63
64
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statutes unquestionably shield the profession from most external
competition.... [I]t is clear from empirical study that public policy
concerns were not the only driving forces behind the expansion
and strengthening of unauthorized practice of law statutes.”71 This
rationale is not without its support from legal scholars.72 According to Professor Catherine Lanctot from Villanova University Law
School, “Lawyers historically have used the unauthorized practice of law statutes to protect against perceived incursions by real
estate agents, bankers, insurance adjusters, and other groups
that seemed to be providing legal services.”73 Even the prominence of smart contracts created through blockchain poses this
threat, as the creation of self-executing and self-enforcing contracts to secure legal rights will thus intrude on what was traditionally a function of an attorney.74
The significance of UPL rules has consistently come into
question.75
Denial of access to justice is not merely a theoretical defect in
the administration of justice; it has deep practical ramifications.
Lacking effective representation, poor persons often see the law
not as a protector, but as an enemy which evicts them from their
flat, victimizes them as consumers, cancels their welfare payments, binds them to usury, and seizes their children.76

Criticism has also come from the federal government.77 In
a joint letter from the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission, both agencies urged the American Bar Association not to adopt the overbroad definition it proposed to implement for it ran the risk of constraining competition between
lawyers and nonlawyers providing similar services to the public.78 As stated by the agencies, “There is no evidence before the
Id. at 715–16.
Comment Letter, supra note 16, at 3.
73 Id. (quoting Possible Anticompetitive Efforts to Restrict Competition on
the Internet: Federal Trade Commission Public Workshop (Oct. 9, 2002) (statement
of Catherine J. Lanctot)).
74 See Templin, supra note 61, at 969.
75 See Brown, supra note 6, at 170.
76 Id. at 161 (quoting Jerome J. Shestack, Will Justice Be Rationed?, 80
MARQ. L. REV. 727, 727 (1997)).
77 Comment Letter, supra note 16, at 16.
78 Id. at 4.
71
72
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ABA of which we are aware that consumers are hurt by this competition and there is substantial evidence that they benefit from
it. Consequently, we recommend that the proposed Model Definition be substantially narrowed or rejected.”79
With the validity of UPL rules existing on thin ice,80 it is
more appropriate to examine the effect of these rules as they
bear on the demographic they were created by legal authorities to
protect, the legal consumer.81 UPL statutes unfairly and overwhelmingly affect populations of limited means or income.82 The
problem only aggregates when considering that there is not enough
availability of pro bono lawyers to meet the needs of these individuals and families.83
The necessity of making legal services accessible to populations of limited means is an area of extensive study.84 LegalZoom’s
own 2012 prospectus states, “Despite the enormous amount spent
on legal services, we believe that small businesses and consumers have not been adequately served by the options traditionally
available to them.”85 A report by the American Bar Association
in 1995 concluded that 70–80% or more of low-income individuals could not access legal assistance when they needed or wanted
it.86 Further, in 2017, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) estimated that low-income Americans would “approach LSCfunded legal aid organizations for support with an estimated 1.7
million problems.... [While] receiv[ing] only limited or no legal help
for more than half of these problems because of a lack of resources.”87 A study by Temple University found that in Florida,
the legal system addressed less than one-third of legal problems
Id. at 3.
See id. at 16.
81 Brown, supra note 6, at 172.
82 Derek A. Denckla, Response, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice
of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2581 (1999).
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 Figueras, supra note 48, at 1421 (quoting LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 1 (May 10, 2012)).
86 Fountaine, supra note 4, at 147.
87 The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income
Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (June 2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files
/images/TheJusticeGap-ExecutiveSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JTG-NAJV].
79
80
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among low- and moderate-income families.88 Cost concerns were
the most common barrier to accessing legal services.89 This gap
in access to legal services by those who need them does not affect low-income households solely:
The justice gap—that is, the gap between legal needs and services available—has the greatest implications for the United
States’ most vulnerable populations: those at greatest risk
under the policies announced by the incoming administration.
On the civil side, people of color, women, immigrants, the elderly,
people with disabilities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender, or LGBT, people are more likely to live in poverty and
more likely to need legal assistance. Claiming protections under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, often requires,
at a minimum, legal advice, and at most, litigation.90

The unfortunate result of the justice gap is that it not only
severely affects populations struggling in poverty, but also perpetuates that poverty.91 The question to ask is whether maintaining a monopoly on legal services through UPL rules is worth
the inaccessibility of legal services by households that desperately need them.
Despite the imbalance of access to legal services, in 2016,
a staggering 89.3% of households in the United States owned a
computer in their home.92 The proposed solution is clear with
these statistics: eliminate UPL rules and allow legal software to
enter the market to help reduce the justice gap.93
It is no new development that legal services are expen94
sive. On the contrary, self-help channels to legal services are
Brown, supra note 6, at 159.
Id.
90 Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, Making Justice Equal, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Dec. 8, 2016, 9:03 AM) (internal citations omitted), https://www.americanprog
ress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/12/08/294479/making-justice-equal/
[https://perma.cc/6UCL-RZE6].
91 Id.
92 Percentage of Households in the United States with a Computer at Home
from 1984 to 2016, STATISTA (Aug. 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics
/214641/household-adoption-rate-of-computer-in-the-us-since-1997/ [https://
perma.cc/J43H-SQXU].
93 See Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 90 (defining the justice gap); Brown,
supra note 6, at 160 (stating that legal self-help materials can help reduce
the justice gap).
94 See Brown, supra note 6, at 159.
88
89
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relatively cheap and increase access to justice.95 Legal software
specifically can address the deficiencies regarding access to services in a multitude of fields.96 For example, regarding end-oflife decision-making or no-contest divorces, there is no need to
pay monopoly prices to an attorney if software is able to complete the same mundane tasks.97 As LegalZoom.com, Inc. v.
North Carolina State Bar showed, there is a growing acceptance
towards legal software entering the legal services market.98 By
rescinding UPL rules, the barriers to access can be eliminated
by legal authorities on a nationwide basis without having to
fight isolated battles in each state that end in settlements with
no clear greenlight for legal software to proliferate.99 Indeed,
even LegalZoom itself is at odds with its own software.100 Although LegalZoom clearly indicates that it is not a law firm and
is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney, the company
accedes to concerns that it may be practicing law.101 In doing so,
LegalZoom provides caution that its services may not be legal
depending on the jurisdiction and evolution of UPL rules.102 Uncertainty is the bane of business, and removing UPL rules will
remove uncertainty in a business model similar to how LegalZoom conducts its business.103
III. PROTECTING THE CONSUMER WITHOUT UPL RULES
Of course, it is noteworthy to state that UPL laws are not
useless pieces of legislation created without purpose.104 Becoming
an attorney licensed to practice law is no easy task; it requires, in
most states,105 completing law school as one of the preliminary
Id. at 159–60.
See id. at 160–61.
97 See id.
98 See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 2, at 39–41.
99 See id. at 44.
100 See Figueras, supra note 48, at 1424.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1424–25.
103 See id. at 1425.
104 See Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 714–15.
105 Zachary Crockett, How to Be a Lawyer Without Going to Law School,
PRICEONOMICS (Jan. 6, 2017), https://priceonomics.com/how-to-be-a-lawyer-with
out-going-to-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/7C58-89VH].
95
96
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steps.106 From there, a law student needs to pass both a Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) and bar
exam to become a fully licensed attorney.107 Therefore, it is rational to state that those individuals who provide legal services
have a background and education to help them provide a degree
of quality legal work and a code of ethics apart from those who
have not surpassed such trials.108
Further, attorneys have an obligation to behave professionally even after the hurdles of the MPRE and bar exam.109
Although a lawyer’s character is evaluated to gain admittance to
the practice, those same ethical standards must be consistently
maintained by the lawyer to continue to practice.110 Individuals
who exhibit bad conduct or poor judgment at any point while being
licensed may be disbarred or punished depending on the severity
of their actions.111 These standards help ensure an adherence to
a professional code of conduct in the legal profession.112
As mentioned, UPL laws then, in effect, attempt to protect the public from individuals who have not achieved the level
of specialized education of a licensed lawyer or who do not have
to conform to a professional standard of conduct.113 Indeed,
commentary to the District of Columbia rule on the unauthorized practice of law provides four general purposes for the rule:
(1) protecting members of the public from unqualified representation; (2) ensuring individuals who identify themselves as lawyers
or their services as legal are held to the D.C. Bar’s disciplinary
system; (3) maintaining efficiency and integrity within the justice system and regulation of lawyers; and (4) ensuring the D.C.
Bar is financially supported by those who are members of the
D.C. Bar.114
Becoming a Lawyer, LEGAL CAREER PATH, https://legalcareerpath.com
/becoming-an-attorney/ [https://perma.cc/EJ2S-PK6T].
107 Id.
108 See Denckla, supra note 82, at 2581.
109 See id. at 2582.
110 See id.
111 Id.
112 See id.
113 Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 714–15.
114 Michael E. Rosman, Is It Time to Revisit the Constitutionality of Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules?, 20 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 74, 76 (2019).
106
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These arguments are certainly viable.115 However, they
are also subject to pitfalls.116 The assumption that protecting the
consumer public by ensuring that “unqualified parties” do not
provide legal services assumes that those who are not qualified
would provide incompetent, or less effective, legal services.117 This is
a flawed assumption.118 Although licensed lawyers do have specialized knowledge, that does not mean they are otherwise more
qualified to perform certain tasks.119 For example, “nonlawyer
advocates who advise tenants on a daily basis about how to trek
through the thicket of New York City’s housing court often help
train lawyers who are volunteering their services to poor tenants pro bono.”120 It is difficult to argue that providing services
such as printing standardized forms tailored to individuals, as
was the case in Brumbaugh, requires any more than basic training.121 If these services can be provided to consumers at a much
more affordable price while still maintaining the integrity of the
work’s quality,122 there is little reason to maintain a monopoly of
legal services in favor of licensed lawyers.
The protections offered to consumers regarding ethical
and moral rules imposed on a lawyer are subject to the same
scrutiny.123 Although there is an intricate framework of rules
and regulations that govern a lawyer’s code of conduct, studies
of the attorney discipline system reveal that lawyers are rarely
reprimanded by the legal system for their shortcomings or incompetence.124 According to one Professor, if non-lawyers were
able to practice law, “[t]he law of malpractice, contract and fiduciary
limits on fee charges, and agency rules requiring loyalty to a principal would probably protect clients almost as well [as the lawyer
discipline system].”125 Indeed, while there has been a growing
See Denckla, supra note 82, at 2593.
See id. at 2594–95, 2597.
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118 Id.
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movement in the business world for corporations to adhere to a
code of business ethics, commentaries have suggested that the
opposite has been present within the legal community, where a
decline in professionalism has been observed.126
One would think that UPL rules, championing the protection
of the consumer, would garner public support for their existence.
However, numerous incidents exemplify that this is not the case.127
“[N]ational organizations with large membership bases, such as
the American Association of Retired Persons, have campaigned
to end UPL restrictions because the consumer public is not being
served effectively by lawyers and should have a choice as to who
represents them.”128 In Arizona, citizens had an opportunity to
vote through a referendum on whether to approve of UPL rules.129
The result ended with a majority of the votes in favor of rejecting those rules.130
To adequately protect consumers in a society without UPL
rules, the legal landscape must continue to hold bad and negligent actors liable. Legal malpractice claims exist to redress an
injury an individual has received from a licensed lawyer’s negligence or intent to harm the consumer.131 The same protections
would need to include any provider of legal services and ensure
non-lawyers are also potentially liable for legal malpractice suits.132
Specifically, legal malpractice claims would need to provide a
private right of action to consumers of legal services against parties that provide legal services rather than specifically against
licensed attorneys.133
For this to be successful, the expansion of legal malpractice
would have to be mostly parallel in its structure when applied to
unlicensed individuals or entities providing legal services.134 Legal
malpractice, although varying from state to state,135 typically
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See id. at 2596.
128 Id.
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requires (1) an existing attorney-client relationship that “placed
a duty upon the attorney to exercise reasonable professional care,
skill, and knowledge in providing legal services[,] ... (2) a breach of
that duty[,]” and (3) harm or damage caused by a breach of that
duty.136 The issue between expanding legal malpractice claims to
non-lawyers arises from the existence of an attorney-client relationship and the breach of the duty that relationship imposes.137
The attorney-client relationship is a fundamental principle in the legal field that serves to protect the interests of the
party seeking legal services.138 This “duty,” placed upon an attorney to his clients, is encoded within the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct and provides, among
other protections, that the attorney will keep certain communications between the attorney and the client private and that the
attorney will provide competent representation.139 The attorneyclient relationship can be formed by an attorney with even prospective clients.140 Although the exact definition varies from state to
state,141 failure to uphold the duty can lead to legal malpractice
claims against the attorney.142
Where the expansion of legal malpractice claims to nonattorneys will need to diverge from the traditional factors is
regarding this attorney-client relationship.143 As mentioned earlier, the attorney-client relationship is imposed on an attorney
136 Moore v. Grau, 193 A.3d 272, 277 (N.H. 2018) (quoting Yager v. Clauson,
101 A.3d 6 (2014)).
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www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_
rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_18_duties_of_prospective_client/ [https://
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[https://perma.cc/Q5ES-55NT].
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by professional codes of conduct that hold the attorney liable for
failing to uphold the minimum standards of conduct.144 Since
this relationship or the state’s code of professional conduct does
not bind a non-lawyer, the first element requiring an attorneyclient relationship would have to instead impose a general professional duty on the provider of the legal service rather than an
“attorney” client privilege.145 This professional duty is not a new
phenomenon or one that is not already present in other fields;
the first element in medical malpractice requires this exact relationship.146 Risks are associated with seeking legal services from
a provider not licensed to practice law, as state professional codes
of conduct do not bind these providers as they do lawyers.147
However, these risks are inherent with choosing legal software
or unlicensed individuals over a licensed attorney, and certainly
do not automatically represent any less quality services.148
Another avenue of recourse for a party would be through
false advertising claims.149 With an end on the legal monopoly,
bad actors who would mislead consumers on the nature or quality
of their services may enter the market.150 In order to provide a
smooth transition following the elimination of UPL statutes,
protections for consumers against these actors in the market need
to exist to ensure that the quality of legal services do not mislead
consumers.151 There are both state and federal laws on false advertising, and, in the states that do not have specific false advertising avenues, common law fraud is a cause of action to reprimand
these actors.152
An abundance of case law restricts law firms and lawyers
from making false claims on the type or expertise of their
services,153 and this same line of reasoning should be applied to
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any legal service provider rather than only lawyers or law firms.154
For instance, regarding attorney advertising, New Jersey held
that these types of advertisements need to be predominantly
informational, whereas drawings, animations, music, and lyrics
are limited to television advertising.155 Meanwhile in Rhode Island, listing areas of expertise is restricted when lawyers or law
firms advertise.156 In Carter v. Lovett & Linder, Ltd., the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island upheld a decision by the disciplinary board
against a law firm that listed specific areas of expertise when
advertising the firm.157 In that case, the court clarified that this
restriction applies even in instances in which an individual can
perceive an area of expertise, even if it is not explicitly stated in
the advertisement.158 These varying state principles must have
a parallel application to any legal service provided by nonlawyers to create an effective avenue of protecting consumers in
a world without UPL rules.159
Federal false advertising law is another avenue to protect
consumers.160 The Lanham Act enables parties to pursue civil lawsuits for advertisements that “‘misrepresent[] the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin’ of goods or services.”161
Implementing similar rigid protections that safeguard consumers
at the advertising stage can minimize and, over time, hopefully
eliminate the potential drawbacks of eliminating UPL statutes.162
IV.THE ECONOMICS OF A MONOPOLY ON THE LEGAL MARKET
“Senator Henry Clay was right when he told the U.S.
Senate in 1832, ‘[o]f all human powers operating on the affairs of
mankind, none is greater than that of competition.’”163 As stated
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earlier, UPL rules have created a monopoly on legal services.164
Absent government intervention, a monopoly can choose any price
for its goods or services, and it will do so in a manner that will
yield the highest possible profits.165 A monopoly can charge prices
above what they would be when other competitors are able to enter
the market.166 “When the monopolist raises prices above the competitive level in order to reap his monopoly profits, customers
buy less of the product, less is produced, and society as a whole
is worse off. In short, monopoly reduces society’s income.”167 Unfortunately, this becomes an issue of public policy when a monopoly dominates in a market whose services are critical to the
public, such as legal services, and a portion of the public is unable to access these services because of high prices.168 However,
the solution to ending this monopoly is simple on its face: eliminate UPL rules.
Monopolies similar to the one present in the legal market
are not a new phenomenon devoid of solutions and debate.169 In
the field of medicine, prominent twentieth century economist
Milton Friedman argued that state licensing procedures limited
entry into the medical profession.170 This barrier allowed licensed doctors to charge fees higher than what would be the case
had the competition been more open.171
The very notion of a closed market in this fashion distorts
basic principles of supply and demand.172 In the process of private contracting and the exchange of goods and services, information is signaled through prices.173 In a normal free market
scenario, sellers cut prices to attract buyers, whereas buyers signal
their preferences for specific goods and services by increasing
See Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 713–14.
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what they are willing to pay for such products.174 When the “price[]
exceed[s the] cost[], sellers make a profit.”175 This has the effect of
drawing competitors to the specific market, thus driving down
prices due to a supply increase in what is known as price competition.176 Resultingly, when access to a market by sellers is barricaded, price competition is not able to flourish due to the limited
number of sellers.177
Lower prices are not the only benefit from an open mar178
ket. Competitors often improve their products and services to
gain an advantage over rivals.179 “Competitive rivalry among
suppliers and buyers is a powerful incentive to search for knowledge. Self-interest motivates ceaseless, widespread, and often
costly efforts to make the best use of one’s property and skills.”180
This is the process of innovation that brings new products to
consumers or improves upon currently existing ones.181 In this
sense, the possibilities for innovation in the legal market are endless. Products similar to LegalZoom may enter the market in
droves, not only providing similar services but driving down
prices to grab more of a market share.182 Lower prices will shrink
the justice gap allowing more and more consumers to fulfill their
legal needs.183 Innovation in the market would open the possibility of expanding the services offered by such products, thus not
only increasing the number of legal services offered by technology,
but further driving prices down as roles traditionally attributed
to attorneys become digital.184 However, decreasing prices should
not cause alarm about overall revenue in the market.185 Lower
prices mean more consumers are able to participate in the market,
and the revenue will instead flow from the original monopoly
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holders towards sellers who can provide the best quality products
at the best available price.186
Monopolies disrupt the delicate balance between supply
and demand.187 The difficulty is ending the consolidation of market share owned by monopoly forces. Over the long term, monopolies survive as a result of government protection.188 There is
a certain irony when the legal market’s protection comes from
legal authorities themselves.189 As a result, this reality makes it
difficult to break the grip on market share by the entities promulgating UPL rules.190 However, as most economists agree, it is
important to protect competition in the marketplace as unrestrained competition is a public good and essential to the wealth
of a nation.191 Indeed, protection of the open market drives political
action in the fields of union power, antitrust, and other free
market principles.192 This same mentality and drive towards action
should be mirrored in the legal market.
What is clear is that once UPL rules are eliminated by the
respective legal authorities, other players will be able to enter
the market; this inevitably will have the effect of driving down
prices and eliminating monopoly power.193 LegalZoom itself was
born amid a thriving UPL-dominated market.194 Should the barriers to access be eliminated, innovation and competition will
surely pour into the market and build upon what LegalZoom has
started.195 From there, innovation is a reasonable expectation in
the marketplace for legal services,196 and with that innovation
society can finally provide effective legal representation and
services to a population that it has long since ignored.197
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CONCLUSION
UPL laws have been propagated and sold as an effective
measure of consumer protection for legal services, specifically,
“the need of the public for integrity and competence of those who
undertake to render legal services.”198 Their rise in the early
twentieth century was indeed premised by their creators on this
notion,199 and today they are widespread throughout every state.200
However, as technology progressed, the purported purpose of UPL rules began to lose credibility.201 This is exemplified
by the alarming statistics that the monopoly on legal services by
lawyers has created: a disjunction between parties who desperately need legal services and access to those services.202 The
mechanism used to “protect members of the public from unqualified representation” instead has become a hindrance to members
of the public from obtaining any representation at all.203
Legal software has the potential to fill in the gap where
justice is void.204 By providing legal services to communities at a
lower cost, the justice gap will effectively be narrowed by increased
access to such services.205 But it cannot be done efficiently with
the existence of UPL rules, which on their face, bar the activities
of legal software and unlicensed representation and have created
an era of uncertainty on the future of legal software.206
Once UPL statutes are no longer a barrier to entry, an influx of sellers will drive down market prices.207 Even further,
players in the market will attempt to innovate on existing legal
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goods and services to increase their own profits, leading to better
quality representation at a more affordable price for consumers.208 The solution is quite simple on its face then, eliminate
UPL rules and allow the free market to innovate the future of
legal services. To the current players in the legal monopoly, this
is a handful to accept.209 With control of monopoly prices leading
to extraordinary gains,210 the current monopolists of the legal
world will have a tough time allowing other competitors to enter
the market.211 Given that the gatekeepers of the monopoly power
on legal services are lawyers, judges, and other individuals in the
legal field themselves, it will be challenging to truly eliminate
UPL statutes without resistance.212
Should UPL rules be successfully eliminated, it is important
to provide protections to consumers. This should begin with an
expansion of legal malpractice to include any form of legal work
regardless of whether the service is provided by a licensed attorney, an unlicensed player, or legal software.213 In doing so, it will
be important to distinguish a critical element of current malpractice law, the attorney-client relationship, to adapt to the new
malpractice standards successfully.214
Additionally, it is important to expand false advertising
law to encompass otherwise misleading and inaccurate portrayals of legal services by new players in the legal market.215 The
basis for these claims are already cemented into federal and
state law.216 However, to be effective when new technology and
competitors enter the legal market, the same principles that apply
to law firms and lawyers regarding false advertising claims will
have to apply to the new market similarly.217 This means that
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any restriction or regulation affecting current players will have
to apply to unlicensed attorneys and legal software.218 It is crucial that with such a leap to an open market for legal services,
equal protections follow to ensure a smooth and efficient transition.
In an increasingly technological and global society, it is
finally time to let the leashes go on the legal monopoly.219 In
doing so, it is wise to follow the new players in the market while
also staying wary of the legal implications that will follow. However,
in society’s interest and those who have been most adversely affected by UPL statutes,220 it is best to welcome this change with
open arms.
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